Gender Parity: The Increasing Success and Subsequent Effect of Anti-Male Bias Claims in Campus Sexual Assault Proceedings by Fang, Weiru
Cornell Law Review
Volume 104
Issue 2 January 2019 Article 4
Gender Parity: The Increasing Success and
Subsequent Effect of Anti-Male Bias Claims in
Campus Sexual Assault Proceedings
Weiru Fang
Cornell Law School, J.D. 2018, wf87@g.cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Weiru Fang, Gender Parity: The Increasing Success and Subsequent Effect of Anti-Male Bias Claims in Campus Sexual Assault Proceedings,
104 Cornell L. Rev. 467 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol104/iss2/4
NOTE
GENDER PARITY: THE INCREASING SUCCESS AND
SUBSEQUENT EFFECT OF 'ANTI-MALE BIAS'
CLAIMS IN CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT
PROCEEDINGS
Weiru Fangt
INTRODUCTION ........................................... 467
I. TITLE IX ....................................... 469
A. The Context of Campus Sexual Assault ....... 469
B. Title IX and Sexual Assault ................... 471
C. Legislative Direction .......................... 471
II. TITLE IX AND THE ACCUSED: AN OVERVIEW OF ANTI-
M ALE BIAS SUITS .................................. 474
A. Pre-Twombly/IqbaL Yusuf v. Vassar College... 474
B. Second Circuit: Presumption-Shifting
Fram ework ................................... 477
C. Sixth Circuit: Twombly/Iqbal Standard ....... 480
III. A PRO-PLAINTIFF PROPOSAL ......................... 481
A. Reconciling Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit
Approaches ........................ ........ 482
B. Why Twombly/Iqbal Pleading Alone is
Insuffi cient ................................... 486
C. Plaintiff Presumption and Summary Judgment
.......................................... 488
IV. CRITICISMS AND LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES .......... 491
A. Social Stakes ................................. 491
B. Economic Costs .............................. 494
CONCLUSION ............................................ 494
INTRODUCTION
The conventional narrative of sexual assault on college
campuses typically focuses on the struggles of a victim seeking
t J.D. 2018, Cornell Law School; Notes Editor, Cornell Law Review, Vol. 103.
Many thanks to the staff of Cornell Law Review for their editing and feedback. I
thank Brenden Mcdearmon for his constant encouragement and advice on this
topic and many others. Thank you to my support system throughout law school:
Jenny Hu, Gargi Chaudhuri, Kendall Karr, and Cassie Desjourdy. Lastly, I am
immensely grateful for my family, without whom none of this would be possible.
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justice against a perpetrator'-from Emma Sulkowicz carrying
a mattress in protest of sexual assault at Columbia University2
to the flawed police investigations against Florida State star
athlete Jameis Winston. 3 In recent years, however, a surge of
Title IX claims have been promulgated by accused students-
the alleged perpetrators of sexual assault-against their re-
spective universities in federal courts. Indeed, more federal
courts are allowing accused students to move forward with
Title IX lawsuits against their respective schools on legal
grounds such as violation of due process, breach of contract,
and-for the sake of this Note-gender bias. 4 Despite the in-
crease in "anti-male bias" claims, the various circuit courts
remain divided as to the standard under which to examine
them: whereas the Second Circuit grants the plaintiff a burden-
shifting "temporary presumption" with respect to pleading dis-
criminatory intent, 5 the Sixth Circuit adheres to the ordinary
"plausibility" standard as required by the Twombly and Iqbal
line of cases. 6 This split with respect to the appropriate legal
standard and, relatedly, the sufficiency of pleadings, raise
practical concerns for accused students.
Part I of this Note briefly discusses sexual assault and the
legislative and legal history of Title IX. Part II of this Note
provides an overview of "male bias" gender-discrimination suits
and focuses in particular on the recent decisions by the Second
Circuit and Sixth Circuit. In Part III, this Note explains the
discrepancy behind the circuit split and illustrates the ramifi-
1 Throughout this Note, the term "victim" is used to refer to an individual
who alleges that he or she has been sexually assaulted without passing judgment
on the individual for his or her experience or endorsing the validity of his or her
claims. The term "perpetrator" or "accused student" is used to refer to an individ-
ual who allegedly committed the crime without, again, assuming the truth of the
allegations.
2 See Roberta Smith, In a Mattress, a Lever for Art and Political Protest, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/arts/design/tn-
a-mattress-a-fulcrum-of-art-and-political-protest.html [http: //perma.cc/P5DM-
2WWJ] (describing Sulkowicz's project as "an artwork of last resort" after Colum-
bia University found her alleged perpetrator of sexual assault not guilty).
3 See Walt Bogdanich, A Star Player Accused, and a Flawed Rape Investiga-
tion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/04/
16 /sports/ errors-in-inquiry-on-rape- allegations-against-fsu-j ameis-winston.
html [http://perma.cc/AVT2-HA7Q] (reporting that neither the police nor Florida
State University investigated the victim's rape claims against Winston).
4 Samantha Harris, Due Process Legal Update: More Students' Lawsuits
Move Forward, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://
www.theflre.org/due-process-legal-update-more-students-lawsuits-move-for
ward/ [http: //perma.cc/4V47-S5QP].
5 Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 53-56 (2d Cir. 2016).
6 Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018).
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cations of applying one standard over another by pointing to
similar arguments made within the Title VII employment con-
text. This Note contends, further, that for the sake of maintain-
ing consistency across jurisprudence and vindicating the goals
of discrimination laws at large, courts should adopt the plain-
tiff-presumption approach as advocated by the Second Circuit
and consider dismissal of non-substantiated claims at the later
summary judgment phase. Lastly, in Part IV, this Note will
address policy and legal implications of allowing gender-bias
discrimination claims for the accused student, ultimately cau-
tioning that "anti-male" bias claims should be treated similarly
to other gender-discrimination claims.
I
TITLE IX
A. The Context of Campus Sexual Assault
For the purposes of this Note, the broad definition of sexual
assault encompasses situations where a person is unlawfully
coerced or physically compelled by another person to commit a
sexual act. It goes without saying that the legal system should
encourage sexual assault victims to report their experiences
and achieve the justice that they deserve. 7 Because sexual
assaults are still largely unreported, statistics regarding sexual
assault on and off college campuses may not fully reflect the
nature of the issue. Only about 10% of all rapes in America are
ever reported to the police and of these only 14 to 18% are
ultimately prosecuted." Though law enforcement agencies
throughout the United States are required to collect informa-
tion on campus crimes, many experts believe these official
crime statistics underestimate-possibly significantly-the
prevalence of sexual violence. 9 Some ascribe the low rates to
7 Cf. HEATHER B. GONZALEZ & JODY FEDER, CONG, RESEARCH SERV., SEXUAL
VIOLENCE AT INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, (2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/nisc/R43764.pdf [http://perma.cc/ARW2-87CE] (listing consequences for
victims, including physical injuries, unintended pregnancies, sexually transmit-
ted diseases, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, suicidality, and sub-
stance abuse).
8 Emily Matchar, New Campus Sexual Assault Legislation Is Not Enough to
Prevent Another Florida State Scandal, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 18, 2014), https://
newrepublic.com/article/ 117414/new-sexual-assault-legislation-wont-prevent-
another-florida-state [http: //perma.cc/9NA8-B7BA].
9 Christopher Krebs & Christine Lindquist, Setting the Record Straight on '1
in 5," TME (Dec. 15, 2014), http://time.com/3633903/campus-rape-I-in-5-sex
ual-assault-setting-record-straight/ [http: //perma.cc/CA2B-N8PM].
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"[prosecutors often only tak[ing] cases they can win."1° Moreo-
ver, studies show that women between the ages of sixteen and
twenty-four are raped four times as often as the national aver-
age for all women." One reason for these statistics is that
women in this age group tend to experience more rapes that fall
into the category of "alcohol-related" rape or "acquaintance"
rape. These types of rapes tend to be reported less by victims
and are less likely to be prosecuted than "stranger rape."12
These "he said, she said" cases are often dismissed by the
police and prosecutors. 13
Women are typically thought of as the victims in these
sexual assault cases, but men can also be at risk for sexual
assault. Because so few men report sexual assault, informa-
tion is limited about the prevalence and nature of the prob-
lem. 14 Survey data suggest that up to 10% of acquaintance
rape victims on campus are men, and college men are more
likely to report experiencing unwanted kissing or fondling than
sexual intercourse. ' 5
Though all statistics should be regarded cautiously, a re-
port by the independent risk management and insurance firm,
United Educators, provides a baseline understanding of the
scope and extent of current Title IX sexual-assault lawsuits. 16
Its findings, based on 305 claims from 104 colleges between
January 1, 2011 and December 31, 2013, note that almost
10 UNIV. OF KY. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, TOP TEN THINGS
ADVOCATES NEED TO KNOW QUESTION 7, WHAT PERCENTAGE OF RAPE CASES GETS PROSE-
CUTED? WHAT ARE THE RATES OF CONVICTION? 1, (Dec. 2011), https://opsvaw.as.uky.
edu/sites/ default/files/07_RapeProsecution.pdf [http: //perma.cc/P6C9-
KGDP].
11 Matchar, supra note 8. But see Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrec-
tion, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double-x/
doublex/2014/12/college rape-campussexual assault is a serious-problem
but theefforts.html [http://perma.cc/7J73-X4NU] (questioning the methodol-
ogy of government statistics regarding sexual assault, including the lack of com-
parison of victimization rates of students to non-students of the same age).
12 Matchar, supra note 8.
13 IJd
14 RANA SAMPSON, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, PROBLEM-SPECIFIC GUIDE No. 17, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS
(Aug. 7, 2003), https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/cdrom/inaction 1/pubs/Acquain-
tanceRapeCollegeStudents.pdf [http://perma.cc/B6NQ-9CVX (stating that even
current national data collection systems fail to capture information about rape of
men, as the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR) does not provide data on male rape
victims).
15 IdL
16 See EDURISK, UNITED EDUCATORS, CONFRONTING CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: AN
EXAMINATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION CLAIMS (2015), http://www.ncdsv.org/
ERS Confronting-Campus-Sexual-Assault_2015. pdf [http: //perma.cc/R3PF-
53MA].
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99% of the perpetrators were men while 94% of victims were
women. 17 Victims filed suit against their institutions in 68% of
the litigated cases and accounted for 84% (or $14.3 million) of
the total payouts by the institutions.' 8 Perpetrators filed the
remaining 32% of lawsuits against institutions, mostly in reac-
tion to sanctions taken by the institutions against them. 19 Af-
ter negligence and breach of contract, Title IX claims-
specifically focusing on "inherently discriminatory [policies and
process] toward men" or alleging that the institution reached
an unfair outcome against them to stave off adverse findings by
the Department of Education Office of Civil Rights (OCR)-con-
stituted the third-most frequent allegation made by perpetra-
tors against institutions. 20
B. Title IX and Sexual Assault
In its final form, Title IX states that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any education program or activity receiving
federal fmancial assistance." 2 1 The Supreme Court held that
an individual has an implied private right of action to sue civilly
to enforce his or her rights under Title IX, even though the
statute does not explicitly provide for such action. 22 In the
sexual-harassment context, the Supreme Court ruled that
schools could be held responsible for "student-on-student"
harassment. 23 Schools are held responsible if the harassment,
even if occurring only once, was "so severe, pervasive, and ob-
jectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by
the school."24
C. Legislative Direction
In 2011, the OCR under President Obama released detailed
guidelines in a now-notorious "Dear Colleague Letter," explain-
17 Id.
18 IcL
19 IcL
20 I& (noting that 72% of perpetrators who sued the institution also sued the
victim for defamation or slander, suggesting that, "for some perpetrators, litiga-
tion is a means to repair their reputation").
21 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
22 Cannon v. Univ. of Chl., 441 U.S. 677, 709-10 (1979).
23 Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650
(1999).
24 ICL
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ing the requirements of Title IX as it pertains to sexual harass-
ment and sexual violence.2 5 While the letter clarified that it did
not add requirements to applicable law, it provided "informa-
tion and examples to inform recipients about how OCR evalu-
ates whether covered entities are complying with their legal
obligations."26 The letter and its subsequent Question and An-
swer companion document explained, among other topics, the
proper notice and the appropriate evidentiary standard for in-
vestigations; moreover, the letter warned that non-compliance
could result in a Title IX investigation and loss of federal fund-
ing. 2 7 Almost immediately, the Department of Education be-
came inundated with Title IX investigations at college
campuses.2 8 Data show that the number of sexual-violence
complaints increased from just 9 complaints in 2009 to 102 by
2014.29 As of December 7, 2016, the OCR estimated there were
292 sexual-violence cases under investigation at 219 post-sec-
ondary institutions. 30
In 2017, the Department of Education under President
Trump formally rescinded the "Dear Colleague Letter" and its
companion text, asserting that the documents "created a sys-
tem that lacked basic elements of due process and failed to
ensure fundamental fairness." 3 1 The department's rescission
corresponded to growing public backlash against the 2011 let-
25 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER 1
n.1 (Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/col-
league-201104.html [http: //perma.cc/87F6-ZXTWI.
26 ICL
27 Id.; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/of-
fices/llst/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [http: //perma.cc/QM63-38AA].
28 Allie Bidwell, College Sexual Violence Complaints Up 1,000 Percent in 5
Years, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 5, 2015, 5:03 PM), http://www.usnews.
com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/05/05/college-ttle-ix-sexual-violence-com-
plaints-increase-more-than- 1-000-percent-in-5-years [http: //perma.cc/E3C7-
RSRP].
29 ICL
30 E-mail from Tamara Merges, Customer Service, Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep't of Educ., to author (Dec. 12, 2016) (on file with author).
31 Press Office, Department of Education Issues New Interim Guidance on
Campus Sexual Misconduct, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://
www. ed.gov/news/press-releases/department-education-issues-new-interim-
guidance-campus-sexual-misconduct [http://perma.cc/8GR8-9FZ6]. The re-
scission of the 2011 "Dear Colleague Letter" and criticism by the Trump Adminis-
tration have not, to date, impacted how courts analyze an accused student's Title
IX claim. Though some plaintiffs have relied on the rescission to argue that
universities violated Title IX by conforming to the letter's guidelines, courts have
declined to give any weight to such arguments and have simply stated that inter-
pretations of Title IX can change. See Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-CV-1069,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180267, at *40 (N.D.N.Y Oct. 31, 2017).
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ter, as commentators noted students on both sides caught in a
web of bureaucracy and overzealousness on the part of the
administration to protect federal funding. 32 Most notably, the
new letter revoked the mandate that schools use the "prepon-
derance of the evidence standard"-what critics described as
too low of an evidentiary burden-and allowed schools to de-
cide whether to use the higher "clear and convincing evidence"
standard.33 What remains, nevertheless, are the school's af-
firmative duties to understand the allegations of sexual mis-
conduct, respond "appropriately," and take interim measures
for the involved parties. 34
For some, Title IX's ability to pursue perpetrators is "an
opportunity to achieve the punishment and accountability de-
nied to many under the current criminal law regime."3 5 Critics
of the "Dear Colleague Letter" interpretation of Title IX, how-
ever, contend that these punitive measures blame the individ-
ual student rather than seek structural changes on a societal
level. 3 6
32 For discussions about the impact of Title IX proceedings, see Emily Yoffe,
The Uncomfortable Truth About Campus Rape Policy, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2017),
https: //www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-uncomfortable-
truth-about-campus-rape-policy/538974/ [http://perma.cc/62LY-MLCT ("[The
alleged perpetrator's] lawsuit describes the period that followed as one of extreme
stress, during which he lost weight, contracted pneumonia, and was forced to
drop two courses because the restrictions placed on him precluded him from
attending class during his midterm exams... His lawyer asked for the hearing to
be rescheduled [because of emotional collapse], but the school refused, so it went
on without him. He was found not responsible for sexual misconduct.").
33 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., Q&A ON CAMPUS SEXUAL MIS-
CONDUCT (2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-title-ix-
201709.pdf [http: //perna.cc/VML7-FNFQ].
34 Id.
35 Erin Collins, The Criminalization of Title IX, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 365, 367
(2016) (discussing how some feminist legal theorists see Title IX's punitive aspect
as a victory).
36 Id. ("[T]he prevailing interpretations of Title IX sacrifice structural critiques
of the origins of gendered violence in favor of a myopic focus on individual respon-
sibility as the key to remedying the problem of campus sexual assault. It is a
largely reactive approach that, while not carceral in the technical sense because it
does not lead to incarceration or expand the prison state, embraces criminal law's
fundamental dedication to punitive, rather than redistributive, solutions to social
issues.").
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II
TITLE IX AND THE ACCUSED: AN OVERVIEW OF ANTI-MALE
BIAS SUITS
A. Pre-Twombly/IqbaL Yusuf v. Vassar College
Though the bulk of lawsuits initiated by perpetrators grew
exponentially only within the last few years, the initial legal
framework for these cases stems from the 1994 case Yusuf v.
Vassar CoUege.37 In Yusuf, the Second Circuit held that Title
IX bars the "imposition of university discipline where gender is
a motivating factor in the decision to discipline."38 The court
established that accused students who attack a university dis-
ciplinary proceeding for gender bias generally fall within two
categories. 39 In the first type of cases, a plaintiff alleges "selec-
tive enforcement": regardless of his or her guilt, the plaintiff
argues that the severity of the penalty imposed and/or the
decision to initiate the proceeding was attributed, in some part,
to the student's gender.40 These claims are difficult to litigate
because, if the plaintiff is male, these claims require the plain-
tiff to allege that a female accused of similar sexual misconduct
was treated preferentially by the university; practically speak-
ing, such cases almost never exist.4 1 The second category of
cases-"erroneous outcome" cases-encompass situations
where a plaintiff alleges that he or she was innocent and was
wrongly found by the school to have committed sexual miscon-
duct.42 With the latter category of cases, the Yusuf court cre-
ated the now widely used, two-prong "erroneous outcome" test:
"In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must
specifically allege the events claimed to constitute intentional
discrimination as well as circumstances giving rise to a plausi-
ble inference of [gender] discriminatory intent."43 In other
words, the plaintiff must allege "particular facts sufficient to
cast some articulable doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of
37 35 F.3d 709, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1994). Though the Second Circuit's decision
is of course not binding for all courts, it is highly persuasive and has been utilized
by other courts. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, No. 14-30143-MGM,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91995, at *24 (D. Mass. July 14, 2015) ("Lacking guidance
from the First Circuit, this court turns to the analytic framework set forth by the
Second Circuit in Yusuf v. Vassar College.").
38 Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715 (emphasis added).
39 Id
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Ict. at 713.
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the disciplinary proceeding" as well as causally link the flawed
outcome with gender bias. 44
At the time of the decision, the Yusuf court operated under
the Conley pleading standard of the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading re-
quirements-which is more lenient than the later Twomblyl
Iqbal heightened pleading standard. 45 Under the Conley stan-
dard, a complaint must be allowed "unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief."46 This standard
reflected an intent to grant plaintiffs their day in court and to
ensure that defendants simply had "notice" of the claims.
47
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a com-
plaint merely needs to contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."48 The
plaintiffs alleged facts are assumed and, if proven, must sup-
port an inference of discrimination-a burden that the Yusuf
court described as "not heavy.
'
"
4 9
To allege "particularized facts" of the erroneous outcome, a
plaintiff may include particular evidentiary weaknesses behind
the finding of an offense, such as a complainant's or witnesses'
motives to lie, particularized strengths of the defense, or other
reasons to doubt the veracity of the charge. 50 A complaint may
also allege particular procedural flaws affecting the proof of
evidence. The causal element of the "erroneous decision" anal-
ysis-what the Yusuf court described as the "fatal gap"-deals
with whether the plaintiff can state with some "specificity" a
causal connection between the flawed outcome and gender
bias. A plaintiff must allege "particular circumstances sug-
gesting that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the
erroneous finding."5 1 In particular, the Yusuf court noted that
a plaintiff may use statements by members of the disciplinary
tribunal, statements by pertinent university officials, or pat-
terns of decision making to plead causation. Such examples of
44 Id. at 715.
45 Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 21 (2008) ("Conley's 'no set of facts' language, at least if
read literally, represented an endorsement of 'notice' pleading in its least demand-
ing form.")
46 Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 713 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
47 See Tanvir Vahora, Note, Working Through a Muddled Standard: Pleading
Discrimination Cases After Iqbal, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 235, 241-42
(2010).
48 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
49 Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715.
50 Jd
51 Id.
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gender bias, the court went on to say, can be found in the
"familiar setting of Title VII cases."' 52
In allowing the plaintiffs case to move forward, the Yusuf
court held both that the plaintiffs complaint alleged particular-
ized facts and also identified a causal connection. The Yusuf
court noted that the plaintiff had identified retaliatory motives
by the alleged victim as well as various actions by the presiding
disciplinary tribunal official that prevented him from fully de-
fending himself.53 Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that
the plaintiff had sufficiently stated a pattern of biased decision-
making through his allegation that accused-male perpetrators
at Vassar were "historically and systematically" and "invariably
found guilty, regardless of the evidence, or lack thereof."54 The
court stated that the allegations that males invariably lose
when charged with sexual harassment at Vassar "provides a
verifiable causal connection similar to the use of statistical
evidence in an employment case."5 5 Indeed, the court added
that "similar allegations, if based on race . .. would more than
suffice in a Title VII case."5 6 The court, however, noted, "We
need not pause at the pleading stage of the proceedings to
consider issues regarding what statistical sample would be sig-
nificant or what degree of consistency in outcome would consti-
tute a relevant pattern."57
52 Id. The court cited various Title VII cases as examples illustrating the
contours of the causation prong: Silver v. City Univ. of N.Y., 947 F.2d 1021,
1022-23 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a university's internal memorandum stating
that candidates should include a significant representation of minorities and
females was not sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent or purpose); Lopez v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 159-60 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that an African-
American employee failed to establish a prima facie disparate impact case by
"merely" showing a void of black employees in his regional office and noting that
the causal requirement of Title VII recognizes underrepresentation of African-
Americans might result from any number of factors); Krieger v. Gold Bond Bldg.
Prods., 863 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that an employer's deci-
sion to fire a woman employee despite good job performance amounted to gender
discrimination and violated Title VII).
53 Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 716 ("Fairly read, Yusuf s complaint alleges that a false
and somewhat stale charge of sexual harassment was made against him only after
he pursued criminal charges for a brutal assault by the complainant's
boyfriend.").
54 Id.
55 Id. (citing Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1990)).
In Hollander, the Second Circuit stated that "[elvidence relating to company-wide
practices may reveal patterns of discrimination against a group of employees."
Hollander, 895 F.2d at 84.
56 Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 716.
57 Id.
476 [Vol. 104:467
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B. Second Circuit: Presumption-Shifting Framework
Since the Yusuf case in 1994, male students accused by
their respective schools of sexual assault have continued to sue
on gender-discrimination grounds under Title IX-though
largely to no avail. 58 For years, many commentators felt that
an accused student would have a difficult time alleging and
proving gender-bias claims under Title IX. 59 Curiously, these
gender claims persisted, perhaps in part on symbolic
grounds, 60 but also perhaps with an eye towards settlement
amounts. 6 1 As one commentator speculated, "These [gender-
bias] Title IX suits are not faring well so far, but all it takes is
one good win with the right set of facts and the right attorney,
and a whole new venue of litigation will open up."62
In 2016, the "right" case indeed came along. In John Doe v.
Columbia University, the Second Circuit-the same court that
decided Yusuf-held that an accused student's claim under
Title IX alleging "anti-male" bias met the minimal "plausible
inference" to survive dismissal. 63 This decision was particu-
larly surprising given the heightened pleading requirements
post-Yusuf. after the Twombly64 decision and the subsequent
58 Jake New, Suits from the Accused, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 1, 2015), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/01/students-accused-sexual-assault-
struggle-win-gender-bias-lawsuits [http://perma.cc/WH9L-LD5V].
59 See, e.g., Allie Grasgreen, Going on Offense with Title IX, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/09/accused-
rape-men-allege-discrimination-under-title-ix fhttp://perma.cc/PBB3-PMUV]
("Assuming that the policies themselves do not single out a differential treatment
for men and women-and I would be shocked if they did-and assuming they
don't have smoking-gun evidence of bias against men, I think that it would be a
very difficult road for the plaintiff here[.]").
60 See Nora Caplan-Bricker, Testing Title IX, SLATE (Mar. 15, 2016, 12:55 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double-x/doublex/2016/03/paul-nunges-
serscolumbiatitle x caseis-part of Ialarger-legal-theory.html [http://
perma.cc/3HNS-H6Z4] ("It may be that plaintiffs continue to advance the Title IX
theory because if they could establish that universities are routinely liable under
Title IX for disciplining students for sexual assault, it would create the impression
that Title IX is inherently contradictory, unworkable and its application to sexual
assault should be repealed.").
61 See, e.g., Kevin Connell, Tennessee Settles Title IX Lawsuit for $2.48 Mil-
lion, GRIDIRON Now (Jul. 5, 2016), http://gridironnow.com/tennessee-settles-title-
ix-lawsuit-2-48-miUion/ [http://perma.cc/N6H7-X83X] (detailing a university's
$2.48 million settlement with eight female plaintiffs).
62 New, supra note 58.
63 Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2016).
64 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding plaintiffs
allegations of defendants conspiring to create barriers to entry by others and not
to compete in each other's marketplaces, which would have violated section one of
the Sherman Act if true, were mere legal conclusions and thus were not plausible
enough to survive dismissal).
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Iqba 6 5 decision, a plaintiffs allegations must rise to a level of
"plausibility" so that the court can draw "a plausible inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."6 6 Plau-
sibility, though not like a probability requirement, requires
"more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully."67
In allowing the plaintiffs motion to survive dismissal, the
Second Circuit stated that the applicable framework was a bur-
den-shifting temporary presumption for the plaintiff, as estab-
lished by the McDonnell Douglas68 line of employment-
discrimination cases, and this framework adopted from Title
VII was appropriate in the Title IX setting. 69 The court justified
its decision to look to Title VII jurisprudence by noting the
similarity between claims from Title VII and Title IX, particu-
larly on their facts. Moreover, the court cited the frequency
with which other courts, including the Supreme Court, look to
Title VII case law to interpret Title IX.70 Ultimately, the court
wrote:
We therefore hold that the temporary presumption afforded
to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases under Title
VII applies to sex discrimination plaintiffs under Title IX as
well.
Thus, a complaint under Title IX, alleging that the plain-
tiff was subjected to discrimination on account of sex in the
imposition of university discipline, is sufficient with respect
to the element of discriminatory intent, like a complaint
under Title VII, if it pleads specific facts that support a mini-
65 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (dismissing plaintiffs Bivens
claim because it was not plausible that defendants had "improper" motives of
discrimination on the basis of race, religion or national origins where defendants,
as top-level officials, had apparent motives such as a desire to protect national
security). Although the Iqbal decision and Twombly decision are different cases
with different factual underpinnings, this Note refers to them as a single entity for
convenience's sake.
66 Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 54 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
67 Id.
68 See McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir. 2015) ("[Iln the initial
phase of the case, the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case without evidence
sufficient to show discriminatory motivation... If the plaintiff can show (1) that
she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for employment in
the position; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and, in addition,
has (4) some minimal evidence suggesting an inference that the employer acted
with discriminatory motivation, such a showing will raise a temporary 'presump-
tion' of discriminatory motivation, shifting the burden of production to the em-
ployer and requiring the employer to come forward with its justification for the
adverse employment action against the plaintiff." (citations omitted)).
69 Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 53-56.
70 Id. at 56.
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mal plausible inference of such discrimination... McDonnell-
Douglas's temporary presumption in a plaintiffs favor reduces
the plaintiffs pleading burden, so that the alleged facts need
support only a minimal inference of bias.
7 1
With respect to the sufficiency of federal complaints generally,
the court turned to Second Circuit precedents:
In Littlejohn, we clarified that Iqbal applies to employment-
discrimination complaints brought under Title VII. "To the
same extent that the McDonnell Douglas temporary presump-
tion reduces the facts a plaintiff would need to show to defeat
a motion for summary judgment prior to the defendant's fur-
nishing of a non-discriminatory motivation, that presump-
tion also reduces the facts needed to be pleaded under IqbaL"
Because "[t]he discrimination complaint, by definition, oc-
curs in the first stage of the litigation.., the complaint also
benefits from the temporary presumption and must be
viewed in light of the plaintiffs minimum burden to show
discriminatory intent."
In other words, at the 12(b)(6) stage of a Title VII suit,
allegations of facts supporting a minimal plausible inference
of discriminatory intent suffices as to this element of the
claim because this entitles the plaintiff to the temporary pre-
sumption of McDonnell Douglas until the defendant furnishes
its asserted reasons for its action against the plaintiff.
7 2
In this case, the Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs
complaint identified sufficiently specific facts to survive dismis-
sal because of "pro-female, anti-male bias" on the part of Co-
lumbia's hearing panel, which the university adopted at least
in part to refute criticisms lodged by the student body and
press against the university for its treatment of sexual-assault
victims. 7 3 The court noted that "[wihen the evidence substan-
tially favors one party's version of a disputed matter, but an
evaluator forms a conclusion in favor of the other side (without
an apparent reason based in the evidence), it is plausible to
infer . . . that the evaluator has been influenced by bias."
74
Here, the plaintiff alleged Jane Doe was an altogether willing
participant, no evidence was presented to the contrary, and
still the hearing panel decided against him. On these facts
alone, however, the court seemed reluctant to acknowledge a
plausible inference of bias on account of sex. But because the
university faced substantial criticism in the period preceding
71 Id (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 54-55 (citations omitted).
73 Id. at 56.
74 Id. at 57.
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the disciplinary hearing, the court found it was "entirely plausi-
ble" that the university's decision-makers and its investigators
were motivated to favor the accused female over the accused
male. 7
5
C. Sixth Circuit: Twombly/lqbal Standard
To date, the Sixth Circuit uses the general Tvombly/Iqbal
pleading standard without modification with respect to Title IX
cases. 76 To justify its decision, the Sixth Circuit stated merely
that its precedent, unlike the Second Circuit's, does not sup-
port a reduced pleading standard. 77 The court held that "a
plaintiff asserting a Title VII claim must plead sufficient factual
allegations to satisfy Twombly and Iqbal in alleging the re-
quired element of discriminatory intent."78
Although it did not adopt the presumption-shifting frame-
work, the Sixth Circuit continued to cite to the Second Circuit's
analysis with respect to "selective enforcement" and "erroneous
decision" claims. 7 9 In Doe v. Cummins, the Sixth Circuit cited
to Yusufs "erroneous outcome" analysis and held that the stu-
dents' claims failed to allege a causal connection between the
adverse outcomes in their hearings and gender bias.8 0 The
Cummins court said that, unlike in the Columbia case, the
Cummins plaintiffs did not allege "additional facts" such as
"substantial" and "public" criticism.8 1 Similarly, the accused
students failed to show the procedural deficiencies in their ad-
judicatory proceedings were connected to bias.8 2 The court
explained,
[T]hese deficiencies at most show a disciplinary system that
is biased in favor of alleged victims and against those ac-
cused of misconduct. But this does not equate to gender bias
because sexual-assault victims can be both male and
female. 8 3
The court additionally dismissed the students' argument
that the university evinced a "pattern" of discrimination when,
in each of the nine sexual-assault cases adjudicated since
2011, the accused student was male and was found "responsi-
75 Id.
76 See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 588 (6th Cir. 2018).
77 Id. at 589.
78 Id. (citing Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609-10 (6th Cir. 2012)).
79 Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed. Appx. 437, 451 (6th Cir. 2016).
80 Id at 452.
81 Id. at 452-53.
82 Id. at 453.
83 Id.
480 [Vol. 104:467
GENDER PARITY
ble."84 The court explained that the students failed to eliminate
"the most obvious reasons," which were that the university
only received complaints of male-on-female sexual assault and
males were less likely than females to report sexual assault.
8 5
Furthermore, the court explained that nine cases was an insuf-
ficient sample size to draw any reasonable inferences of gender
bias.8 6
In Doe v. Miami University, the Sixth Circuit allowed a
plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss with respect to the
plaintiffs "erroneous outcome" claim.87 The court stated that
the plaintiffs allegations indicated a potential pattern of gen-
der-based decision-making that met the Twombly/Iqbal stan-
dard8 8 because every male student accused of sexual
misconduct in the Fall 2013 and Spring 2014 semesters was
found responsible for the alleged violation, and nearly 90% of
students found responsible for sexual misconduct between
2011 and 2014 had male first names. 89 Moreover, the plaintiff
incorporated an attorney's affidavit, which described a pattern
of the university pursuing investigations concerning male stu-
dents but not female students. The court also stated that the
plaintiff alleged a sufficient causal connection because Miami
University faced external pressures from the federal govern-
ment and private lawsuits, including one from a complainant
who stated that she would not have been assaulted if the uni-
versity had expelled her attacker for prior offenses. Conse-
quently, "the statistical evidence that ostensibly shows a
pattern of gender-based decision-making and the external
pressure on Miami University supports at the motion-to-dis-
miss stage a reasonable inference of gender discrimination."90
III
A PRO-PLAINTIFF PROPOSAL
Arguably, the Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit interpreta-
tions of the 12(b)(6) pleading standards in Title IX are not mu-
84 Id.
85 Id. at 453-54.
86 Id.; see also Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 943 (6th Cir.
1987) (finding sample size of seventeen cases insufficient to support an inference
of discrimination in the employment context).
87 Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 584 (6th Cir. 2018).
88 See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) ("[The facts must]
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [gender
discrimination].").
89 Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594.
90 Id. at 593.
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tually exclusive. This section seeks to reconcile the two
approaches and proposes that the plaintiff should be allowed to
plead a prima facie case with a reduced pleading burden, or, if
failing to do so, plead under the general Twombly/Iqbal stan-
dard. In the first part of this section, this Note illustrates the
different presumptions guiding the Second Circuit and Sixth
Circuit with respect to their understanding of Swierkiewicz91
and reconciles the presumptions with each other. Next, this
Note illustrates why the Twombly/Iqbal standard by itself may
be insufficient for discrimination cases in the Title VII or Title
IX context. Lastly, this Note advocates that, under the general
Twombly/Iqbal standard, courts should at the outset utilize
the McDonnell Douglas temporary plaintiff-presumption plead-
ing to avoid conflating the requirements at the 12(b)(6) stage
with the requirements reserved for summary judgment. More-
over, the McDonnell Douglas framework allows for flexibility in
pleading so that if a plaintiff cannot plead a prima facie case,
they can still plead generally under Twombly/Iqbal.
A. Reconciling Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit
Approaches
To evaluate the appropriate pleading standard for Title IX
"anti-male" bias claims, three relevant questions emerge. First,
does the Twombly/Iqbal standard apply in the Title IX context?
Second, if it does, does the Twombly/Iqbal standard supplant
the McDonnell Douglas framework or can the two coexist?
Third, what drives this reasoning?
Both the Sixth Circuit and the Second Circuit agree that
Twombly/Iqbal applies in the Title VII context and thus, by
extension, also in the Title IX context. In Littlejohn, the Second
Circuit "conclude[d] that Iqba's requirement applies to Title
VII complaints of employment discrimination, but does not af-
fect the benefit to plaintiffs pronounced in the McDonnell Doug-
las quartet."92 The Second Circuit, in Columbia, not only
referenced its precedent in Littlejohn but also reiterated Iqbal at
the outset of discussions. 93 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit stated
in Keys that "the Supreme Court established a 'plausibility'
standard in Twombly and Iqbal for assessing whether a com-
plaint's factual allegations support its legal conclusions, and
that standard applies to causation in discrimination claims."94
91 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
92 Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 310 (2d Cir. 2015).
93 Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 2016).
94 Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2012).
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The Sixth Circuit reiterated this standard in Doe v. Miami
University.9 5
The thornier question is whether and how the McDonnell
Douglas framework interacts with the Twombly/Iqbal standard
at the pleading stage. Recall, the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie framework in Title VII is a three-step process. 96 First, a
plaintiff must sufficiently plead and prove a prima facie case of
discrimination. A Title IX plaintiff has to allege and ultimately
prove four factors: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class,9 7 (2) was innocent, (3) suffered an adverse disciplinary
action, and (4) has at least minimal support for the proposition
that the disciplinary hearing committee and/or investigator
were motivated by discriminatory intent. In essence, a court
presumes the adverse decision against the plaintiff was a result
of discriminatory motive. 98 A court typically evaluates the suf-
ficiency of the prima facie case at the summary judgment stage
of the proceedings. 99 If a plaintiff is successful in proving the
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articu-
late some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the Title IX
hearing committee's and/or investigator's decision. 1 00 The de-
fendant's burden is one of production, whereas the plaintiff still
has the burden of persuasion. 10 ' At this stage, if the defendant
meets its burden, the plaintiffs presumption "simply drops out
of the picture."10 2 At the final stage, the plaintiff has the oppor-
tunity to present evidence showing that the committee's stated
reasons for the discipline were not the true reasons for the
95 882 F.3d 579, 584 (6th Cir. 2018).
96 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
97 Recall that "protected class" merely means that the plaintiff was discrimi-
nated against on some impermissible basis such as race or gender. See Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976).
98 See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) ("Es-
tablishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact be-
lieves the plaintiffs evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the
presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of
fact remains in the case.").
99 See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2298 (1995) ("In the conventional application of
summary judgment principles to McDonnell Douglas-Burdine cases, the prima
facie case is treated as a required 'element' of the case, and the plaintiffs failure to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a prima facie case
entitles the defendant to summary judgment.")
100 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
101 Id.
102 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
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intentional discrimination.1 0 3 To avoid summary judgment,
then, a plaintiff must refute the committee's stated reasons
since the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the
plaintiff. 1 0 4
In light of Twombly/Iqbal, the Second Circuit clearly ex-
pressed that the McDonnell Douglas plaintiff presumption and
Twombly/Iqbal standard coexist. It stated:
As for the argument that the Supreme Court was unlikely to
have intended in Iqbal to add new wrinkles to the special field
of Title VII suits, which the Supreme Court had so extensively
covered in the McDonnell Douglas quartet of cases, arguably
there is no incompatibility, or even tension, between the bur-
den-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas and a require-
ment that the complaint include reference to sufficient facts
to make its claim plausible-at least so long as the require-
ment to plead facts is assessed in light of the presumption
that arises in the plaintiffs favor under McDonnell Douglas in
the first stage of the litigation. 10 5
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit declined to read the McDonnell
Douglas framework as having a role under the Twombly/Iqbal
standard. 10 6 In so doing, the Sixth Circuit demonstrated a
narrow reading of Swierkiewicz-a 2002 Supreme Court case
whose status as good law after Twombly/Iqbal remains highly
contested. 107
In Swierkiewicz, the plaintiff alleged a violation of Title VII
because of his national origin as well as a violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 10 The complaint
alleged facts regarding the events leading up to the plaintiffs
termination, relevant dates, nationalities, and ages of those
involved in his termination. Ultimately, the court held that the
complaint contained sufficient facts to survive a motion to
dismiss.
Both the Second Circuit and Sixth Circuit understand
Swierkiewicz to be good law, though they differ in their under-
standings of what the case stands for. For the Sixth Circuit,
Swierkiewicz stands for the proposition that a plaintiff must
not be required to plead a prima facie case under the McDonnell
Douglas standard. The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the Su-
L03 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
104 Id
L05 Llttlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 310 (2d Cir. 2015).
106 Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609-610 (6th Cir. 2012).
107 See, e.g., Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009)
(stating that Twombly and Iqbal were the "demise of Swierkiewicz).
108 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
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preme Court "unanimously held that the prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a
pleading requirement. " '0 9 The court went on to quote: "[I]t is
not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing
a prima facie case because the McDonnell Douglas framework
does not apply in every employment discrimination case."'1 10
Because the precise requirements of a prima facie case can
vary depending on the context and occur prior to discovery,
articulating an appropriate formulation of the correct version of
McDonnell Douglas framework may be difficult. " ' Thus, only
the Twombly/Iqbal standard remains. 112 The distinction in the
Second Circuit's approach comes from its reading of
Swierkiewicz as stating merely that a prima facie pleading is a
higher standard than that of Twombly/lqbal; as such, the
prima facie complaint would be sufficient but not necessary to
meeting the Iqbal standard. 113 The Second Circuit character-
ized the subsequent Twombly court's treatment of
Swierkiewicz as "meaning nothing more than that the plain-
tiffs pleadings contained sufficient factual allegations to satisfy
the 'liberal pleading requirements' of the Federal Rules and
that [the Second] Circuit had improperly invoked a 'heightened
pleading standard for Title VII cases.'"" 14 As such, the Second
Circuit reconciled Iqbal-which it characterized as a "broad" 1 5
ruling-as also applying to cases falling under the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Instead of requiring plaintiffs to meet the
heightened pleading requirements of alleging a prima facie case
under the McDonnell Douglas test, the Second Circuit allowed
the plaintiffs complaint to benefit from the McDonnell Douglas
plaintiff presumption by "reduc[ing] the facts needed to be
pleaded under Iqbal" at the first pleading stage. 116
109 Keys, 684 F.3d at 609.
110 I& (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510). The Swierkiewlcz Court rea-
soned that the prima facie analysis does not apply in every discrimination case,
such as cases involving direct evidence of discrimination. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S.
at 511. Moreover, the Court stated that it would be "incongruous" to require a
plaintiff to plead more facts than he may ultimately need to prove to succeed on
the merits if direct evidence of discrimination is later discovered. Id. at 511-12.
111 Id.
112 See Keys, 684 F.3d at 609 ("[T]he ordinary rules of notice pleading
apply ....").
113 Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 310 (2d Cir. 2015).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 309.
116 Id.at310.
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B. Why Twombly/Iqbal Pleading Alone is Insufficient
Procedural decisions such as early dismissal may have im-
pacts that go beyond the court's evaluation of the complaint.
In some cases, early rulings on procedural issues lead to an
effective revision of substantive law "through the back door."1 17
The impacts of Twombly/Iqbal have been significant, especially
in the employment-discrimination context. In general, the
Twombly/Iqbal standard may invite judicial subjectivity and
impermissible probabilistic determinations.
Courts may turn "a relatively cursory evaluation appropri-
ate for a preliminary stage of the litigation, namely, whether
any set of facts could support the allegations in a complaint,
into a more searching inquiry about whether those allegations
were 'plausible.'"1 18 Under the Twombly/Iqbal standard,
courts are invited to "draw on [their] judicial experience and
common sense" to evaluate the plausibility of complaints. 119
Whereas the evaluation at the 12(b)(6) stage should determine
only whether pleadings are "consistent with" liability-an ap-
proach that requires nothing more than a rational examination
of the complaint by measuring the factual allegations against
the legal claims to see "if they fit"-courts have instead asked
whether alternative explanations for the events are "more
likely" than the allegations made by the plaintiff. 120 At least
one court, however, has dismissed a case for failing to elimi-
nate alternative reasons in the pleading-that the university
had only received complaints of male-on-female sexual assault
and that males were less likely than females to report sexual
assault-rather than evaluating the actual plausibility of the
pleading. 12 1 This is, effectively, an impermissible probabilistic
determination and invites judicial subjectivity. 122
Another example of the dangers of probabilistic determina-
tion under the Twombly/iqbal standard is a court's belief that
the sufficiency of the pleading hinges on the plaintiffs ability to
allege that an investigation or treatment throughout investiga-
tion would have been different if the plaintiff was female. 12 3 It
is not hard to imagine the scarcity of cases, particularly at a
117 Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, "Only Procedural": Thoughts on
the Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 767, 768 (2012).
118 Id. at 769.
119 Id. at 773.
120 IJ
121 See Doe v. Cummins, 662 Fed. Appx. 437, 453 (6th Cir. 2016).
122 Id.
123 Doe v. Coil. of Wooster, 243 F. Supp. 3d 875, 887 (N.D. Ohio 2017).
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single university, in which these cases are reported and docu-
mented; moreover, a plaintiff would likely only obtain such
evidence during the discovery phase, after 12(b)(6) dismissal.
Similarly, judicial subjectivity has led to unpredictable rulings
and confusing usage of "statistics" to evince a pattern of biased
decision-making. The Sixth Circuit alone has muddled the
plaintiffs ability to use "statistics" in proving causation at the
pleading stage. 124 Moreover, courts should not require the use
of statistics to demonstrate causation at this early stage of the
proceeding. 125
Male gender-discrimination cases invite the danger of
judges relying too much on their "general schemas" in decision-
making: courts are understandably reluctant, based on "com-
mon sense," to allow men to plead gender bias, particularly in
the painful context of sexual assault. 126 The danger both at the
Title IX disciplinary level and at the judicial pleading level is to
conflate a plaintiffs alleged actions with the merits of his dis-
crimination case. As one court stated in an early anti-male
bias case, Nungesser v. Columbia University:
[Nungesser] assumes that because the allegations against
him concerned a sexual act that everything that follows from
it is "sex-based" within the meaning of Title IX. He is wrong.
Taken to its logical extreme, Nungesser's position would lead
to the conclusion that those who commit, or are accused of
committing, sexual assault are a protected class under Title
IX. 127
The court's skepticism here is evident and certainly war-
ranted in some cases. Still, the potential harm to plaintiffs in
Title IX discrimination cases can be significant. As discussed
in greater detail later on, the best approach to these "anti-male"
bias claims should be to view them not as "reverse discrimina-
tion" cases but rather as discrimination cases, plain and sim-
124 Compare Cummins, 662 Fed. Appx. at 454 (holding that plaintiffs did not
evince a "pattern" of discrimination by alleging that nine male accused students
were "responsible" in the cases since 2011), with Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d
579, 593 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a pattern of
gender bias by stating that every male student accused of sexual misconduct in
the Fall 2013 and Spring 2014 semesters was found responsible for the alleged
violation).
125 See Doe v. Brown Univ., 166 F. Supp. 3d 177, 189 (D.R.I. 2016) ("Requiring
that a male student conclusively demonstrate, at the pleading stage, with statisti-
cal evidence and/or data analysis that female students accused of sexual assault
were treated differently, is both practically impossible and inconsistent with the
standard used in other discrimination contexts.").
126 Schneider & Gertner, supra note 117, at 775-76.
127 169 F. Supp. 3d 353, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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ple. Not only does equal enforcement of the law ensure justice
for all individuals seeking legitimate redress, but also, equal
enforcement reinforces the legal system's institutional value by
being gender neutral. 12 8
Like in many other types of discrimination cases, Title IX
plaintiffs often face the problem of information asymmetry.
The facts in Marshall v. Indiana University, 129 for example, il-
lustrate a common situation in which the defendants have sole
possession of all the information relating to the allegations,
which they then refuse to share with the plaintiff. At the same
time, the defendants can successfully argue that a court
should dismiss the plaintiffs pleading for failure to identify
more particularized facts. At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of the
pleading, the parties have not yet proceeded to discovery and
thus lack a factual record, unlike the summary judgment
phase. In essence, as one commentator put it, the pleading
standard under Twombly/Iqbal "perpetuates a catch-22 scena-
rio: a plaintiff cannot access discriminatory evidence without
the use of discovery, but the complaint is dismissed before the
discovery stage."130
C. Plaintiff Presumption and Summary Judgment
A court should grant a plaintiff alleging gender bias the
McDonnell Douglas plaintiff presumption at the Federal Rule
12(b)(6) pleading stage if the plaintiff chooses to plead a prima
facie case. This framework, introduced by the Second Circuit
in Columbia, allows a plaintiff to plead sufficiently-but mini-
mally-under Iqbal while still inviting the plaintiff to benefit
from discovery. Whereas potentially meritorious claims may
survive Rule 12(b)(6)'s gatekeeper function in greater numbers,
non-meritorious claims will not survive summary judgment. 131
Assuming, as the Second and Sixth Circuit do, that
Swierkiewicz remains good law, it stands merely for the pro-
position that the McDonnell Douglas framework was too de-
manding of a standard under the Conley Rule 12(b)(6) pleading
standards. 132 The McDonnell Douglas framework, however, is
128 See discussion infra subpart IV.A.
129 170 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1210 (S.D. Ind. 2016).
130 Bethany A. Corbin, Riding the Wave or Drowning?: An Analysis of Gender
Bias and Twombly/Iqbal in Title IXAccused Student Lawsuits, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
2665, 2688-89 (2017).
131 See FED. R. CIv. P. 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
132 See discussion supra subpart III.A.
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and should be read as permissive under Twombly/Iqbas
heightened "plausibility" standard. By reducing the factual al-
legations required at the complaint stage of the proceeding,
courts can sidestep any discrepancies between the McDonnell
Douglas framework and the Twombly/Iqbal standard. 133 More-
over, the prima facie case "was not intended to be an inflexible
rule";134 if a plaintiffs allegations do not allow him or her to
establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff may still plead gener-
ally under the Twombly/Iqbal standard.
One structural argument in support of the McDonnell
Douglas framework is to ensure consistency between Title IX
and other areas of law. Discrimination claims under Title IX,
as it applies to men, should not be treated any differently than
if it were to apply to other more societally vulnerable groups of
individuals. Arguably, allegations of discriminatory intent in
the heightened fervor of Title IX compliance may on their face
be plausible. Though the Supreme Court warned in Iqbal
against conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent, this
reasoning in Iqbal may be distinguished based on the case's
facts. 135 Moreover, the increasing prevalence of courts to allow
"anti-male" bias claims to progress past the Rule 12(b)(6) stage,
whether under Twombly/Iqbal or McDonnell Douglas, points to
a general societal willingness to sustain the plausibility of dis-
criminatory intent in the generally confusing arena of Title
IX. 13 6 Though a plaintiffs pleading must naturally raise more
133 See supra text accompanying note 105; see also Angela K. Herring, Note,
Untangling the Twombly-McDonnell Knot: The Substantive Impact of Procedural
Rules in Title VII Cases, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1083, 1116-17 (2011) (proposing a
judicial "reset" of Title VII doctrine that approaches McDonnell Douglas as sugges-
tive, and flexible proof structures to be applied sensibly rather than rigidly).
134 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978).
135 See Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 179, 204-05
(2010) (detailing how the allegations in Twombly and Iqbal seem somewhat ex-
traordinary on their face).
136 See, e.g., Doe v. Pa. St. Univ., No. 4:17-CV-01315, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3184, at *15-16 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2018) ("Although these allegations do not, in
any sense, raise to the level of blatant and obvious gender bias . . . they are
sufficient to allow this Court to infer that [the university's] disciplinary process is
tainted by anti-male bias."); Neal v. Colo. St. Univ. Pueblo, No. 16-cv-873-RM-
CBS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22196, at *13 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2017) (holding that a
holistic evaluation of pleading, including allegations of an investigator's quota for
finding males, was sufficient under the Twombly/Iqbal standard); Collick v. Wil-
liam Paterson Univ., No. 16-471 (KM) (JBC), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160359, at
*30-35 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2016) ("Whether under the off-the-rack Iqbal standard or
a tailored McDonnell Douglas standard, I would find that gender-based discrimi-
nation in Defendants' treatment [of Plaintiffs] is adequately pled ... True, the
allegations of gender-based discrimination are rife with conclusory assertions...
The Complaint gets a bit closer to sufficiency, however, in alleging that '[als a
purported female victim, the Accuser's allegations against the male plaintiffs were
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than simple legal conclusions, the point here is that allegations
of discriminatory intent in the Title IX setting on their facts
should necessitate a lower factual threshold than for the im-
plausible scenarios in the Twombly and Iqbal cases.
Moreover, the role of summary judgment under the McDon-
nell Douglas framework-that a plaintiff must eventually rebut
the given explanation of the rendered decision as mere pretext
for discrimination to survive summary judgment-helps to ex-
plain the lowered factual showing at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. 137
Whereas the Iqbal court required the plaintiff to plead that his
assertions of discrimination were "more likely" than the govern-
ment's policies at the complaint stage, the McDonnell Douglas
framework already incorporates this rebuttal at the summary
judgment phase. 138 As commentators noted, to meet the new
demands of Twombly and Iqbal, law and facts now have to be
"wedged into a [Rule 12(b)(6)] document that in many instances
is ill-suited for this kind of review." 139 Rather, dismissal
should occur at the summary judgment phase, where a plain-
tiff may present legal and factual arguments in a more inclu-
sive way. 140
Unlike the vague "plausibility" standard, the McDonnell
Douglas framework is simple in its requirements. Courts can
point directly to the four prima facie factors with respect to
deficient pleading. In practical terms, a plaintiff need only
plead (a) the overall factual context of the claim, (b) the causal
link between the adverse action and the protected characteris-
tic (gender), and (c) an optional statement rebutting the deci-
sion-maker's rationale for the actions and decisions taken
against the plaintiff. 14 1 If a plaintiff merely states disagreement
with the outcome and alleges that the decision must have been
accepted as true without any investigation being performed and without the de-
velopment of any facts or exculpatory evidence.'")
137 See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
138 See Collick, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160359, at *35 ("Whether such allega-
tions are true (or can survive summary judgment) remains an open question. At
the pleading stage, however, an allegation that the process was one-sided, irregu-
lar, and unsupported by evidence may give rise to an inference of bias.")
139 Schneider & Gertner, supra note 117, at 774.
140 Id.; see also Collick, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160359, at *35; Doe v. Trs. of
Bos. Coll., 892 F.3d 67, 92 (1st Cir. 2018) ("As this case comes to us on a motion
for summary judgment, after the parties have engaged in substantial discovery, a
complete lack of evidence-whether direct or circumstantial-will not allow a
party to survive a motion for summary judgment. Conclusory allegations are not
enough.")
141 But see Malamud, supra note 99, at 2237 (arguing that the McDonnell
Douglas framework does nothing that the normal Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
cannot do).
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due to "gender bias" simply because he is male and the com-
plainant is female, and the decision was adverse to him, the
complaint will not survive past the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. 14 2 Nev-
ertheless, courts will no longer have to decide at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage whether a plaintiffs claim is more plausible than
not, as tied to the plaintiffs ability to eliminate alternative ex-
planations for the decision. 14 3 Moreover, because the prima
facie case is not meant to be inflexible, a plaintiff may still plead
under the general Twombly/Iqbal standard (though perhaps to
less avail).
IV
CRITICISMS AND LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES
A. Social Stakes
At first blush, it is unsettling to allow an accused male
student to potentially profit from a settlement and embroil the
university in legal battle, which may take time and resources
away from victims. Lower courts and social commentators
have raised certain concerns about these kinds of cases be-
cause they feel that the long-term policy consequences may be
severe for the national discussion of sexual assault. 144 While
142 See, e.g., B.B. v. New School, No. 17 Civ. 8347 (AT), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80068, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2018) (holding plaintiffs complaint that the
disciplinary panel's finding stating "the plaintiff lacked empathy" and was "not
credible" did not suggest gender bias in the form of sex stereotyping against the
plaintiff but was gender neutral and thus warranted dismissal).
143 Note that the plaintiff-presumption in the prima facie framework, as ar-
ticulated by the Second Circuit in the Title IX setting may also have ramifications
in the Title VII setting. Contrary to the ultimate holding of the Fourth Circuit, the
plaintiff in McCleary-Evans would have been able to survive dismissal at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage under the prima facie framework: the Fourth Circuit reasoned the
plaintiffs allegation that non-black decision makers hired non-black applicants
instead of the plaintiff is "consistent" with discrimination but it does not alone
.support a reasonable inference" that the decision makers were motivated by bias.
With a plaintiff presumption, however, the plaintiff would only need to plead facts
that are consistent with a prima facie case with relative factual ease, without
needing to convince the court of the likelihood of success at trial. See McCleary-
Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 587-88 (4th Cir. 2015).
144 See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Former Ivy League Athlete Suspended for Alleged
Sexual Assault Wins Important-and Surprising-Court Victory, WASH. POST (Aug.
1, 2016), https: //www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/ 2 016/08/
01/former-ivy-league-athlete-suspended-for-alleged-sexual-assault-wins-impor-
tant-and-surprising-court-victory/?utm term=.63f0ed98f7dc [http://perma.cc/
L3SF-AYGPI (quoting law professor Jamie Abrams: "The idea that vigilance to
victims is a 'pro woman bias' potentially amounting to discrimination is a con-
cerning perspective . . . It is important that universities continue to recognize
their obligations to investigate and act fairly such that this decision will not
temper or stagnate the critical cultural and institutional changes that were
underway.")
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these are certainly valid considerations, the social stakes for all
those involved-the perpetrator, the victim, the institution, and
the courts-indicate that these claims tend to be more helpful
than they are hurtful.
Sexual-assault perpetrators do not regularly file com-
plaints with the OCR but rather initiate lawsuits in federal
courts. 14 5 Moreover, OCR has historically accepted very few
complaints by these accused perpetrators. The OCR's low ac-
ceptance rates indicate that redress through the judicial sys-
tem may be the only vehicle to achieve justice for the wrongfully
accused. Moreover, equal enforcement of the law also achieves
justice on a societal level and reinforces the legal system's insti-
tutional value as an impartial and fair arbiter. Because the
Title IX legislative guidelines still allow for the preponderance of
the evidence standard, which is lower than that of the criminal
justice system, it is more crucial than ever to have procedural
protections in these federal claims. As legal scholars have
noted, "[i]n law, as in life, getting it right is far more important
than getting it done." 146
Further, one should not think of these "anti-male" gender-
bias claims as "reverse-discrimination" cases. In the employ-
ment context, a typical discrimination claim inherently pits one
candidate against a hypothetical other: one candidate does not
receive the job offer or is fired from the job because someone
else of the other gender obtained the position. Such a scenario
implies a zero-sum game, which does not translate to the Title
IX setting. These lawsuits by perpetrators are zero-sum only
with respect to the institutions, not the victims, to whom much
respect and understanding should be given. Indeed, victims
too can and do file lawsuits against their institutions for re-
dress in their Title IX proceedings. Like in the employment
context, however, these Title IX cases pit one individual dispro-
portionately against an established and endowed institution;
as such, these cases deserve procedural protections. Lastly,
university students are more vulnerable in many respects due
to their young age and lack of experience than comparable
plaintiffs in the employment context.
Anecdotally, racial minorities are vastly overrepresented as
the alleged perpetrators in Title IX sexual-assault cases.14 7
145 Corbin, supra note 130, at 2686.
146 Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error in the New
Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1, 3 (1996).
147 Emily Yoffe, The Question of Race in Campus Sexual-Assault Cases, ATLAN-
TIC (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/
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Commentators have noted that people of color may be
"uniquely defenseless" when it comes to having financial re-
sources, a support network, and an understanding of their
rights. 148 It is not hard to imagine that only a select few perpe-
trators would have the resources (and indignation) to file "anti-
male" bias claims in federal court. With clearer pleading stan-
dards, the legal system can encourage all plaintiffs to seek
redress-not just the highly entitled.
A fair critique of these cases, however, is that the impact on
victims can be devastating. Indeed, allowing a victim's alleged
assaulter to continue with his or her case may signal to the
victim a symbolic defeat or, worse, force victims to relive the
trauma of the sexual assault through depositions or in-court
witness appearances. Still, allowing for fair and equitable pro-
ceedings for an accuser, however, may benefit victims as well.
For one, evidence gathered from a Title IX proceeding in the
discovery phase may help a victim's case in a criminal proceed-
ing if it is gathered without procedural errors. Likewise, by
allowing cases to proceed past the initial fact-finding stage, the
proliferation of gender-bias cases will inevitably expand Title IX
jurisprudence, which still suffers more than similar legislation
from unanswered questions of law.
At least one court has been reluctant to allow gender-dis-
crimination suits for fear of putting universities in a "double
bind" where they would "come under public fire for not re-
sponding to allegations of sexual assault aggressively enough
or... open themselves to Title IX claims simply by enforcing
rules against alleged perpetrators." 149 It is not unreasonable,
however, to ask institutions to strive to both respond to sexual-
assault allegations diligently as well as to correctly disavow
bias when enforcing the rules against accused students. Still,
universities may be greatly impacted by the cases' notoriety
and legal costs. By utilizing the presumption-shifting model,
though, institutions may be better equipped to avoid the costly
discovery expenses that heightened pleading standards sought
to avoid. Moreover, institutions may be more incentivized to
correctly adjudicate with the understanding that these law-
suits cannot be dismissed as a matter of course.
the-questlon-of-race-in-campus-sexual-assault-cases/ 5 3 9 3 6 1/ [http://
perma.cc/6XLP-Q8X4].
148 Id.
149 Austin v. Univ. of Or., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1226-27 (D. Or. 2016).
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B. Economic Costs
One last consideration that deserves mention is the eco-
nomic question: At what cost? On one hand, it is likely that
these gender-discrimination suits will result in more settle-
ment. Whereas settling would likely be off the table if an ac-
cused student failed to state a claim past the initial pleading
stage, universities now are more incentivized to settle because
more and more students will likely sue under these new stan-
dards of pleadings. As the Twombly court stated, "[Tihe threat
of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings."' 50
Discovery expenses can comprise between 50% and 90% of the
total litigation costs. 151
There are ways, however, to limit the costs involved. For
one, the courts can reduce the cost of discovery by limiting
discovery. 15 2 Courts reviewing civil rights cases have increas-
ingly permitted such restricted early stage discovery. 15 3 Al-
lowing limited discovery is relatively risk-free for the court, as a
judge has discretion to approve early stage discovery requests
and the use of this discretion is largely unreviewable. 1 5 4 More-
over, concerns over discovery expenses are already accounted
for in the discovery rules themselves: the Federal Rules explic-
itly state that discovery will not be permitted unless it is "pro-
portional to the needs of the case." 15 5 Procedurally, parties can
request limits on the kind, quantity, and sequence of discovery.
They can also object to particular discovery requests when
those requests are made. 15 6
CONCLUSION
The plot thickens once again in Title IX jurisprudence.
Though Title IX jurisprudence has achieved enormous progress
for victims, the results should not be at the expense of fairness
and equality. In recent years, the number of anti-male bias
150 Bell Alt. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007).
151 John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010).
152 Corbin, supra note 130, at 2711.
153 Id. at 2711-12.
154 Id. at 2712.
155 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
156 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(F) (allowing courts to take appropriate action on
controlling and scheduling discovery); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (allowing courts to
order limitations on discovery); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (allowing parties to move for
protective orders); FED. R. CIv. P. 37 (allowing for a process in which to resolve
discovery disputes).
494 [Vol. 104:467
2019] GENDER PARITY 495
lawsuits have grown exponentially. Moreover, an increasing
number of courts are becoming receptive to the idea of anti-
male discrimination bias, but it still remains to be seen if such
a platform will make much of a difference for the average ac-
cused student. This Note proposes additional ways for a plain-
tiff to plead sufficiently under the Twombly/Iqbal standard
through reconciliation with the McDonnell Douglas framework.
The hope is that all involved parties will benefit: as the old
adage goes, a rising tide lifts all boats.
